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Abstract
This study explores whether the diffusion of gender-equitable attitudes towards female employment
is associated with fertility. We argue that any positive effect on fertility requires not only high levels
of gender-equitable attitudes overall, but also attitude convergence between men and women.
We analyse 27 countries using data from the World Values Surveys and European Values Studies.
We find support for a U-shaped relationship between changes in gender role attitudes and fertility: an
initial drop in fertility is observed as countries move from a traditional to a more gender-symmetric
model. Beyond a certain threshold, additional increases in gender egalitarianism become positively
associated with fertility. This curvi-linear relationship is moderated by the difference in attitudes
between men and women: when there is more agreement, changes are more rapid and the effect of
gender egalitarian attitudes on fertility strengthens.
Introduction
The second half of the 21st century witnessed major
demographic shifts. All developed countries experienced
a decline in marriages accompanied by a rise in divorce
and cohabitation, and fertility rates dropped to historic-
ally low levels. But since the late 1990s we observe a fer-
tility recovery in a large number of the advanced OECD
nations (Goldstein, Sobotka, and Jasilioniene, 2009;
World Bank, 2010; Bongaarts and Sobotka, 2012).
There are several explanations for this fertility rever-
sal. First, as Myrskyla¨, Kohler and Billari (2009) argue,
the recovery is especially likely to occur at advanced de-
velopment levels, measured by the Human Development
Index.
A second approach emphasizes the role of female em-
ployment, showing that the fertility rebound is especially
likely to occur when, as in France, Scandinavia, or the
UnitedStates, female employment becomes the norm
(Ahn and Mira, 2002; Luci and The´venon, 2010;
OECD, 2011). In contrast, the Eastern European and
Mediterranean countries suffer from seemingly persist-
ent ‘lowest-low’ fertility rates, i.e. with Total Fertility
Rates (TFRs)< 1.3 (Kohler, Billari and Ortega, 2002).
A third perspective emphasizes the importance of
reconciling work and motherhood and the degree to
which institutions and policy context promote the
combination of both (Castles, 2003; Saraceno, 2010;
Esping-Andersen et al., 2013). Where it does not, as in
the Mediterranean countries, we are more likely to find
persistent low fertility.
In an early study, Chesnais (1996) suggests that fer-
tility is positively associated with gender egalitarianism
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and reconciliation policies—although only within
advanced nations. McDonald (2000a, 2000b, 2006) de-
velops this idea further. He predicts exceptionally low
fertility where women’s roles have changed but where
institutions and families have not yet adapted. In work
life, this is exemplified by the persistency of gendered
occupational segregation, which tends to mirror the
traditional division of labour in the home (Badgett and
Folbre, 1999; see also Begall and Mills, 2013).
As Esping-Andersen and Billari (2012) argue, the
emergence of reconciliation policies is probably en-
dogenous with respect to women’s changing roles, in
the sense that they are likely to emerge only when the
revolution of women’s roles is already advanced.
Rather than focus on female employment per se, we
attempt to capture society-level attitudes regarding
equal opportunities for participation in the labour mar-
ket for men and women. We explore whether attitudes
in support of men’s and women’s equal right to paid
work are associated with fertility trends at the country
level. Our core hypothesis is that a pervasive degree
of gender-equitable attitudes will promote a better rec-
onciliation of motherhood and careers. Inspired by the
theoretical contributions of McDonald (2000a, 2000b,
2006) and of Esping-Andersen and Billari (2012), we
argue that to be positively associated with fertility, gen-
der-equitable attitudes must not only be strongly present
overall, but also similarly diffused among women
and men.
We use data from the World Values Surveys (WVS)
and European Values Studies (EVS) integrated with data
on TFR from the World Bank’s Indicators and the
Human Fertility Database. Our empirical analyses in-
clude 27 countries observed in 1990, 2000 and 2009.
This allows us to identify shifts from traditional to more
gender-symmetric normative contexts and how these
changes relate to fertility. We find evidence in support
of the hypothesized U-shaped relationship between
changes in gender role attitudes and fertility at the coun-
try level. Our results also show that this relationship
is stronger when the attitudes of men and women
converge.
Gender Equality, Gender Equity, and
Fertility
Fraser (1994) and McDonald (2000b, 2013) make a
clear distinction between gender equality and gender
equity, both conceptually and empirically. Gender
equality, they argue, measures how outcomes in differ-
ent domains (i.e. education, labour market, health, etc.)
differ between men and women. Gender equity, in
contrast, is about the perception of equal opportunities
rather than equality of outcomes (McDonald, 2013,
p. 983). While gender equality is easily quantified, gen-
der equity reflects subjective views. As highlighted by
both Mills (2010) and McDonald (2013), gender equity
is difficult to measure especially at the contextual level
and, in fact, measures of gender equality are often used
as a surrogate.
The Gender-related Development Index (GDI) is an
example of a gender equality measure (McDonald,
2013). In Mills’ (2010) micro-macro study, it emerges
that the GDI is positively and significantly associated
with stronger fertility intentions at the individual level.
Mills illustrates how the societal context of gender
equality also matters for fertility.
A measure similar to the GDI, the Global Gender
Gap Index (GGG), is used by Myrskyla¨, Kohler and
Billari (2011). They show that gender equality, as meas-
ured by cross-sectional levels of GGG,1 is a necessary
condition for a reversal in the relationship between fer-
tility and high degrees of socio-economic development.
In other words, countries ranking high in development
but low in gender equality continue to experience low
fertility.
We believe there is a strong case in favour of a gender
equity effect on fertility, primarily because equity cap-
tures notions of fairness. As emphasized by McDonald
(2013), what matters for fertility is not so much whether
outcomes are gender equal or unequal, but whether they
are considered to be both fair and desirable.
Our study differs from Mills’ (2010) and Myrskyla¨,
Kohler and Billari (2011) in two significant respects:
(i) we focus on the prevalence of gender-equitable
attitudes towards female employment; (ii) we analyze
the changing association between attitudes and fertility
within and across countries and over time. Following
McDonald’s (2013) equity definition, our aim is to
capture perceived gender norms at different times and
in different contexts rather than focusing on gendered
outcomes. The role of established social norms with
respect to gender roles and the division of labour
is also stressed in Esping-Andersen’s (2009) ‘multiple-
equilibrium’ framework which predicts fertility to be
lowest in the early stages of the transition from a trad-
itional to a ‘gender-symmetric’ family model. Once
the transition is completed and a new equilibrium is
attained, one would expect higher fertility levels.
Using outcomes as a measure of gender equality can
in some cases be misleading. For instance, post-Soviet
countries in the 1990s—such as the Balkan countries—
boasted levels of female participation (and education)
similar to the Nordic countries (World Bank, 2010).
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In terms of outcomes, we would classify these countries
as fairly egalitarian. However, these countries displayed
quite traditional gender role attitudes. As Hofa¨cker,
Stoilova and Riebling (2013) note, the ‘double-shift’
phenomenon was prevalent in post-Soviet countries:
employed women generally performed the majority of
household work. Indeed, we shall see that these coun-
tries rank low on our gender equity measure even if
they would score quite high on standard measures
of gendered outcomes, such as female education or
employment.
As mentioned, we focus on the work dimension
of gender equity, using a measure of attitudes regarding
the equal rights of women and men to participate in the
labour force.
Our hypotheses are summarized in Figure 1. The
idea of a U-shaped relationship between TFR and equit-
able gender attitudes over time and for a given country
is taken from Esping-Andersen (2009) and Aassve,
Billari and Pessin (2012). The intervals A, B and C repre-
sent three stages in the transition from traditional to
equitable gender roles attitudes. A represents a society
dominated by traditional gender role attitudes, which is
characterized by the adherence to the male breadwinner
model. In this model, the vast majority of the population
(women included) accept an unequal division of labour.
This is seen as fair and desirable because there is a low
prevalence of persons with gender-equitable attitudes.
This traditional equilibrium should produce high fertil-
ity (and stable marriages). B is an intermediary stage in
which women have abandoned the housewife identity
while society has yet to adapt. In this stage, the percent-
age of people (especially women) with gender-equitable
attitudes is higher than before but is not coupled with
increased opportunities for women. Therefore, the con-
textual situation is considered as unfair by an increased
amount of people. C represents a society that has
fully embraced equitable views towards gender roles.
This new equilibrium is considered by a majority of
the population as fair because the high prevalence of
gender-equitable attitudes is reflected in a society that
offers more equal opportunities.
In the initial stage (moving from A to B), we should
expect declining fertility because this is when women
should experience reconciliation problems (and pos-
sibly also role conflicts) most acutely. As institutions
and partnerships adapt to women’s new identities, and
as gender-equitable attitudes come into dominance
(moving from B to C), we should see a return to higher
fertility—in part because this should be accompanied
by greater gender symmetry in domestic tasks and,
in part, because role conflicts are likely to abate at this
stage.
According to Esping-Andersen and Billari (2012),
when women’s role change has not been accompanied
by greater equity in gender relations, women can re-
spond to perceived unfairness in three distinct ways:
exit, voice, or loyalty. The exit strategy implies forego-
ing marriage and/or reducing fertility in situations where
women are unlikely to find a gender-equitable partner,
or divorcing when conflicts about couple arrangements
emerge. Loyalty implies that women renounce on their
ambitions for emancipation and independence. For ex-
ample, they may curtail their career after having the
first child. Finally, the voice strategy implies an active
effort to realize gender equity. We believe that the gap
between men’s and women’s gender equity attitudes
influences which strategy is more likely to be adopted,
and this can have an impact on how fertility changes
during the transition.
In the first stage of the transition (from A to B), the
diffusion of gender-equitable attitudes is too limited
for the voice strategy to be viable. One would expect
that the loyalty or exit strategy will prevail at this stage.
In contrast, the voice strategy is expected to be more
effective and to be more widely adopted when a ‘critical
Figure 1. Fertility and gender equity: three hypothetical dynamics according to the level of the Gender Gap over time. Note: the
three scenarios differ for the level of Gender Gap (assumed to be constant over time): medium, low, and high, respectively.
372 European Sociological Review, 2015, Vol. 31, No. 3
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/esr/article-abstract/31/3/370/437214 by U
N
IVER
SITA D
I FIR
EN
ZE D
IPAR
TIM
EN
TO
 D
I PED
IATR
IA user on 16 July 2019
mass’ has been reached and when the dynamics of the
transition accelerate, i.e. in the second stage of the tran-
sition (from B to C).
Esping-Andersen and Billari (2012) and Feichtinger
et al. (2013) expect the transition to be more rapid and
the curve to be steeper in more homogenous and less
stratified societies (e.g. where ethnic or social-class
barriers are less accentuated), where also institutions
are expected to adapt quicker. In parallel, we argue that
the transition will also be quicker when there is more
agreement across the sexes.
The panels in Figure 1 represent three different
curves for three hypothetical countries characterized by
different transition scenarios. Panels I, II, and III repre-
sent a hypothetical country where the gender equity gap
between men and women is, respectively, medium, low,
and high.2 While a U-shaped dynamic is expected for all
countries, we argue that the transition is characterized
by a steeper curve for countries where there is more
agreement across the sexes (panel II).
Our hypothesis implies that in the first stage of the
transition, from A to B, the effect of an increase in gen-
der equity on TFR is weaker in a country with a larger
gap between men and women. A larger gap implies that
women with gender-equitable attitudes are more likely
to adopt a loyalty strategy. If this is the case, an increase
in gender-equitable attitudes (mainly driven by women)
will not produce strong effects on fertility. If there is a
narrower gender gap, more men will accept their part-
ners to participate in the labour force. However, in
the first stage of the gender revolution it is likely that
institutions have not (completely) adapted and this may
depress fertility.
Exit strategies are also likely to be adopted in the
first stage of the transition both when the gap is large or
small. However, in the former case it is more likely
that exit strategies increase marital instability (reduced
martial rates and higher divorce rates), while when
gap is lower the exit strategy may imply reducing the
number of children also for married couples. Therefore,
in this case a larger share of couples can be interested
and the depressive effect of fertility is expected to be
stronger.
As noted, in the second stage of the transition (from
B to C), gender-equitable values will spread throughout
society. It is in this phase that the voice strategy is likely
to play an important role. We therefore expect that
overall high levels of gender equity, when combined
with a narrowing of the gender gap, will promote higher
fertility. This is, however, unlikely to occur if only one
of the conditions is met. If high levels of gender equity
coincide with a large gender gap, we should expect that
the exit strategy will still be adopted by a considerable
share of women, implying a weaker positive effect on
fertility.
To summarize, we expect, firstly, to find a U-shaped
relationship between changes in gender equity and fertil-
ity for all countries (Hypothesis 1). Secondly, we argue
that the effect of changes in gender equity on fertility is
stronger when the gap in gender-equitable attitudes by
gender is smaller (Hypothesis 2).
Data and Methods
Our analyses are based on data from the World Values
Survey and the European Values Study. They consist of
repeated cross-sectional individual-level surveys, which
are conducted approximately every 10 years (5 years for
some countries). The first wave was conducted in 1981
and the latest in 2008–2009. Both the countries and the
questionnaires have changed over the years. We focus
on advanced countries, excluding the first wave for
lack of information on our gender equity indicator.
To obtain a balanced data set, we use information on
27 countries for the following three waves: 1990–1993,
1999–2000, and 2006–2009 (See Supplementary Table
S1 for a list of countries).
We focus on one expression of gender equity,
namely, views regarding the proper role of women in the
labour market.3 Our measure is based on the following
question: ‘When jobs are scarce, men should have more
right to a job than women’. This question has been used
to measure discriminatory attitudes towards working
women as it measures whether respondents think that
women are less deserving of employment (Fortin, 2005;
Azmat, Guell and Manning, 2006; Arpino and Tavares,
2013). Seguino (2007) used this question as a measure
of ‘the degree of adherence to norms and stereotypes
about the gender division of labour, gender power, and
men’s and women’s relative rights of access to resources
and opportunities’. The question offers three possible
answers: (i) ‘agree’, (ii) ‘disagree’, and (iii) ‘neither’.
We recode the variable into a binary response: 0 is
‘agree’ or ‘neither’ and 1 is ‘disagree’. Those who score
‘1’ are classified as having gender-equitable views
regarding working women. We limit our sample to re-
spondents aged 14–50 years, i.e. to the population in
the childbearing ages. As a first step, we construct a
variable, which measures the percent gender-equitable
respondents by country and by wave. We will refer to
this as the Gender Equity4 indicator:
Gender Equityc;t ¼ % gender equitable respondents
in country c and in wave t:
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We interpret the aggregated attitudinal indicator as
a measure of gender equity in the labour market. For the
sake of brevity we will use the term gender-equitable
attitudes without specifying that they refer to the work
domain only from here onwards. Our indicator does not
capture directly the perception of fairness and desirabil-
ity of opportunities offered by the society to women in
the labour market, but the two measures are correlated
according to the gender equity theories summarized
above. In particular, there is a U-shaped relationship be-
tween the perception of fairness and the prevalence of
gender-equitable attitudes: in societies that are at stage
A and C, the level of perceived fairness is high, while it
is lower in the intermediate phase.
Our indicator is also a measure of dispersion/concen-
tration: the closer the percentage of gender-equitable
people is to either 0 or 1, the more similar are the values
within a country at a given point in time. However, for
values different from 0 and 1, the same level of gender
equity in two countries can correspond to different pat-
terns of distribution among groups. So, to better analyse
the diffusion of attitudes we also calculate the percent-
age of gender-equitable respondents by sex and compute
the difference to obtain a Gender Gap indicator:
Gender Gapc;t ¼ % gender equitable womenc;t
 % gender equitable menc;t:
The Gender Gap indicator measures the extent to
which gender role attitudes diverge across the sexes. To
adjust for compositional differences across countries
and waves, we replace the actual percent of gender-
equitable respondents by gender/country/wave with the
predicted probabilities of being gender equitable via a
simple probit model where we control for age and edu-
cation.5 Estimates from these models are used to obtain
country-/wave-specific gender equity measures net of
differences in age and educational distributions, i.e. the
resulting levels and gaps will be referred to as ‘adjusted’.
In a second step, we assess the dynamic association
between fertility and gender-equitable attitudes. To
measure fertility, we use data on the TFR taken from the
World Bank’s Indicators6 for all countries with the
exception of East and West Germany, for which we used
the Human Fertility Database (HFD, 2013).
We estimate the following longitudinal model:
TFRc;t¼ b0þ b1Gender Equityc;tþ b2Gender Equity2c;t
þ b3GenderGapc;tþb4GenderGap2c;t
þ b5Gender Equityc;txGenderGapc;t
þ b6Gender Equity2c;txGenderGapc;tþacþ ec;t;
where the subscripts c and t refer, respectively, to coun-
tries and times; ac are country fixed effects; ec,t is the
idiosyncratic error. Because we are interested in within-
country dynamics for gender equity and TFR, we esti-
mate with country fixed effects instead of random
effects. In this way we avoid the implausible assumption
that country-specific effects are uncorrelated with gen-
der attitude dynamics. To test our hypotheses, the model
allows for a non-linear effect of gender equity on TFR,
and for interaction effects between changes in gender
equity levels and the gender gap.
Because the TFR can be subject to annual fluctu-
ations, we take a 3-year average of TFR around the
corresponding survey year instead of the single annual
value.7
Results
Dynamics of Gender-Equitable Attitudes
by Gender
We start by describing Gender Equity levels and dy-
namics during the period 1990–2009. Complete infor-
mation by country and wave on the variables Gender
Equity, Gender Gap, and TFR is available in
Supplementary Table S1. We begin by illustrating the
data graphically. Figure 2 shows the average (over
all waves) Gender Equity indicator by country. As ex-
pected, the Nordic countries score highest, with average
values> 80%. The Anglo-Saxon and some Continental
European countries (e.g. France) score somewhat lower,
followed by Spain with an average value of 74%. Other
Southern European and the German-speaking countries
show much lower values, and at the bottom of the distri-
bution we find the majority of Eastern European coun-
tries with average values <60%.
Figure 3 shows the dynamics of Gender Equity for
men and women separately for each country. The coun-
tries are sorted in increasing order according to the level
of Gender Equity in the first wave of the survey. From
Figure 3, it is evident that patterns differ: not only the
average level at a given time point varies among coun-
tries, but also the way countries experience the transi-
tion towards equity—in terms of agreement among men
and women—is heterogeneous. We focus on two main
characteristics: firstly, how the overall level of Gender
Equity shifts over time; secondly, whether the change is
driven by only one or both genders.
Starting from the top of Figure 3, we can identify
countries at stage A (in Figure 1) with low Gender
Equity values in the 1990s. This is where most of the
Eastern-European countries are located. These countries
have been moving from traditionalism towards a more
374 European Sociological Review, 2015, Vol. 31, No. 3
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gender-equitable society but are still characterized
by comparatively low levels of Gender Equity.
Nevertheless, when examining the Gender Gap, we ob-
serve distinctive patterns. To exemplify, in Bulgaria
and Romania, women scored higher on Gender Equity
in 1990, but men have caught up by 2009. In other
countries, women clearly outpace men, and the Gender
Gap is widening rather than closing—this is the case in
Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and in Estonia.
Moving to the middle of Figure 3, we observe coun-
tries that seem to be hovering between the traditional
and equitable stage (stage B in Figure 1). Here we
observe a greater diversity of countries—mostly
Continental, Mediterranean, and a few Eastern
European countries. In countries such as Belgium,
Hungary, France, Slovenia, and Spain, a steady diffusion
of gender equity can be observed—implying a shift to-
wards stage C. Other countries (Italy, Portugal, East and
West Germany, and Ireland) change at a slower pace.
Regardless of the speed of change, gender differences
in terms of attitudes are noticeable in some countries
(e.g. East Germany and Spain) while inexistent in others
(e.g. France and Belgium). Generally, women are the
vanguard of change.
In the bottom of Figure 3 we find the Nordic and
Anglo-Saxon countries, all of which adhered to stage C
already in the first wave. In Canada, Sweden, Iceland,
and Denmark, gender equity was already widely dif-
fused across the population in 1990 and, moreover,
there were hardly any differences between women and
men. These countries do not experience significant
changes over the period. Indeed, it would seem that
they have completed the transition towards a gender-
equitable society, with the exception of Canada where
the level of Gender Equity stagnates around 80%.
Finland and the Netherlands show lower percentages
of gender-equitable respondents in the early 90s (78
and 72%, respectively) but moved rapidly towards
the completion of the gender role revolution. In the
Netherlands, which reaches a similar average as
Denmark in the third wave, gender role attitudes have
spread equally among women and men throughout the
decades (the gap is always very close to 0). In contrast,
Gender Equity in Finland increased more among women
than men (94 and 80%, respectively in the third wave).
As a consequence, the Gender Gap widened from 6 to
14 percentage points.
The Association between Gender Role Attitudes
and Fertility
We use the panel model described above to test our
overriding hypothesis: namely, that as countries move
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Figure 2. Average level of Gender Equity by country and across waves.
European Sociological Review, 2015, Vol. 31, No. 3 375
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/esr/article-abstract/31/3/370/437214 by U
N
IVER
SITA D
I FIR
EN
ZE D
IPAR
TIM
EN
TO
 D
I PED
IATR
IA user on 16 July 2019
Lithuania Poland Slovakia Romania
Czech Republic Bulgaria Estonia Austria
Latvia Italy Belgium Hungary
Portugal France East Germany Slovenia
West Germany Ireland Spain Finland
Great Britain United States Netherlands Canada
Sweden Iceland Denmark
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Figure 3. Dynamics of adjusted Gender Equity by gender for each country.
Note: Countries are placed in increasing order by the average value of Gender Equity in the first wave of our sample. The percent-
age of gender-equitable men and women are referred to as adjusted because they are estimated using a probit model with controls
for age and education.
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from a traditionalism to gender equity, changes in gen-
der attitudes and TFR are characterized by a U-shaped
relationship; and a low gap between women and men
makes the effect of changes in gender attitudes stronger.
Parameter estimates, reported in Table 2, are difficult to
interpret given the non-linear terms and interactions
involving continuous variables. To ease the interpret-
ation of the results, in Figure 4 we show predicted values
of TFR corresponding to different dynamics of Gender
Equity. In particular, in the left panel of Figure 4 we use
estimates from Model 2 (see Table 2) where only
Gender Equity and its squared value are included as
covariates, and we predict TFR values corresponding to
changes in the level of Gender Equity from 50 to 95%.
The predicted trajectory of TFR as Gender Equity
moves from low to high levels is U-shaped and thus sup-
ports our first hypothesis. The plotted U-shape corres-
ponds, in fact, to a negative estimated coefficient for
Gender Equity and a positive one for its squared term,
as we can see in Table 2. Both coefficients are statistic-
ally significant and indicate that in our sample we ob-
serve a predominantly negative relationship between
changes in equitable attitudes and TFR (a negative coef-
ficient for the linear term), but the relationship turns
positive for high levels of Gender Equity. This happens
around the 75% level.
In the right panel of Figure 4 we use estimates from
the full model (model 5), which includes also the Gender
Gap and its interaction with Gender Equity (i.e. the
model we presented above). Regarding the Gender Gap
we consider three scenarios: small, medium, and large
gaps between women and men. In calculating the pre-
dicted probabilities, we hold the gap constant to show
the effect of changes in levels of Gender Equity in differ-
ent contexts (more or less agreement across genders).
The three levels of the gap correspond to the three
quartiles of the Gender Gap in the pooled data set (see
Table 1).
The right panel of Figure 4 supports our second
hypothesis: the effect of changes in attitudes on TFR is
stronger the smaller is the Gender Gap.8 In the first stage
of the transition (from a traditional to a gender-equit-
able society) the effect of an increase in Gender Equity
on TFR is negative for all considered scenarios. But the
effect is stronger in countries where women and men
are more in agreement (low Gender Gap). The negative
effect of the Gender Gap provides empirical support
for the loyalty strategy over the exit strategy in the first
stage of the transition (stage A). Accordingly, one pos-
sible interpretation is that the larger the Gender Gap,
the more likely women are to renounce on their career
ambitions and to comply with their partners’ gender at-
titudes. In stage B, the moderating effect of the Gender
Gap is almost absent. We observe again a strong inter-
action between Gender Gap and Gender Equity when
the gender role revolution is mature (stage C). In fact,
we observe a positive relationship between Gender
Equity and TFR for countries with low and medium
levels of the Gender Gap, with a stronger relationship
for countries with a small Gap. For a very large Gender
1.1
1.3
1.5
1.7
1.9
2.1
2.3
P
re
di
ct
ed
 T
FR
50 60 70 80 90 100
Gender-Equity
Hyp1 : Level of Gender Equity
1.1
1.3
1.5
1.7
1.9
2.1
2.3
P
re
di
ct
ed
 T
FR
50 60 70 80 90 100
Gender-Equity
Gender Gap=3%-point (1st q-tile)
Gender Gap=8%-point (median)
Gender Gap=15%-point (3rd q-tile)
Hyp2 : Diffusion of Gender Equity
Figure 4. Predicted TFR based on Gender Equity dynamic (Model 2) and for three hypothetical scenarios for the Gender Gap
(Model 5).
Note: The graphs are constructed using estimates of models 2 and 5.
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Gap (15 percentage points) it seems that the relationship
remains negative also for very high overall levels of
Gender Equity. However, these results can be owing
to extrapolations over combinations of levels and gaps
not observed in the data. In fact, for very high levels of
Gender Equity and balanced gender distributions, it is
almost impossible to observe levels of a Gender Gap as
high as 15 percentage points or so. However, the fact
that for very high levels of the gap the effect of increas-
ing Gender Equity on TFR is strongly and persistently
negative is consistent with the hypothesis that gender
convergence in attitudes is decisive to create favourable
conditions for fertility. The predicted TFR dynamics in
Figure 4 refer to a hypothetical country that experiences
a transition from low to high levels of Gender Equity
while maintaining a constant Gender Gap. As was evi-
dent in Figure 3, we cannot actually observe any country
in the considered period undergoing the entire transition
from stage A to C, and not all the countries experience
changes in Gender Equity while maintaining a constant
Gender Gap. With the aim of interpreting dynamics
closer to those that we are actually able to observe, in
Figure 5 we consider predicted values of TFR for dy-
namics of the Gender Equity and Gender Gap that re-
semble those of some selected countries that are
observed in different stages of the transition in the first
wave. In Supplementary Figure S1, we report the pre-
dicted TFRs vs. the observed TFRs for each country
using the country’s Gender Equity and Gender Gap val-
ues and model 5 estimates.
Figure 5 plots the predicted TFR corresponding to
values of the Gender Equity and Gender Gap observed
for Poland, Italy, and the Netherlands, which in the 90s
can be classified at stage A, B, and C, respectively. We
can see that no country is observed in the whole range of
the Gender Equity distribution, and so for a specific
country we cannot predict the U-shaped relationship.
However, the relationship between TFR and Gender
Equity predicted for each country is consistent with our
first hypothesis: if a country is at stage A (as Poland), an
increase in Gender Equity has negative effects on TFR,
while for countries at stage C (as the Netherlands),
Gender Equity and TFR variations are positively
associated.
Robustness Checks
We use several checks to assess the robustness of our
final model (Table 2—Model 5). First, we discuss the
theoretical and empirical validity of our gender equity
measure and replicate our analysis with a synthetic
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for Gender Equity and Gender Gap by wave and across all waves
Mean SD Minimum Maximum First quartile Median Third quartile
Gender Equity
Wave 90–93 63.28 16.57 25.96 94.16 50.71 65.07 71.87
Wave 99–00 73.69 12.73 52.53 95.14 64.39 72.99 84.46
Wave 06–09 77.84 12.84 56.45 98.02 66.36 75.79 88.68
Total 71.60 15.28 25.96 98.02 62.52 71.87 84.46
Gender Gap
Wave 90–93 7.85 7.36 4.36 25.04 2.55 5.82 13.39
Wave 99–00 10.02 7.22 0.57 29.32 5.37 7.52 13.99
Wave 06–09 10.77 8.68 2.63 35.73 2.12 10.59 17.28
Total 9.55 7.78 4.36 35.73 3.54 7.96 14.75
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Figure 5. Predicted TFR using Gender Equity and Gender Gap
values of selected countries observed at different stages of the
transition in the first wave.
Source: Own calculations from World Values Survey,
European Values Study and World Bank Indicators.
Note: The values for Gender Equity and Gender Gap used for
the predictions can be found in Supplementary Table S1 in the
Supplementary Material for each of the selected countries.
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gender index. We argue that among the available gender
items in the WVS–EVS, the survey question we select is
the only that clearly juxtaposes men and women in
terms of their gender roles. In any case, for a smaller
sample we construct a synthetic index using all the avail-
able gender items in the WVS–EVS. Using this index,
our findings support the curvi-linear association be-
tween Gender Equity and TFR but not for the Gender
Gap.
Secondly, we investigate whether the timing of fertil-
ity could affect our results. Tempo-adjusted TFRs are
not available for all the countries and waves in our data
set. So, similarly to Myrskyla¨, Kohler and Billari (2011),
we opt for a second-best solution. We include in our
final regression the pace at which the mean age at child-
bearing is increasing around the survey year. We also
replicate this robustness test using mean age at first
birth. Overall, we find that the curvi-linear relationship
between Gender Equity and TFR remains significant,
while the association with the gender gap loses some
statistical significance.
Thirdly, we consider whether our findings disappear
when adding, in the regression models, independent
variables such as the Human Development Indicator
and female labour force participation rates, which have
been found to be important predictors of TFR changes
in previous studies. We find that the non-linear relation-
ship between Gender Equity and fertility is robust and
that the interaction between Gender Equity and the
Gender Gap remains significant, although only at the
10% level.
Finally, we assess the robustness of our results with
regard to influential data points or any single country.
Excluding influential cases from our preferred model,
we mostly confirm our main empirical findings: we con-
sistently confirm Hypothesis 1 (Gender Level) while we
find weaker support for Hypothesis 2 (Gender Gap).
Taken together, our tests lead us to conclude that our
initial results remain robust. The curvi-linear association
between Gender Equity and TFRs is consistently repli-
cated throughout the different robustness checks.
However, the Gender Gap effect is less robust to differ-
ent specifications. Results from this sensitivity analysis
can be found in the Supplementary Materials.
Concluding Remarks
Our study builds on existing cultural and gendered ex-
planations of fertility in advanced economies. In con-
trast to previous studies, our focus is on gender equity
effects. We construct an attitudinal indicator of Gender
Equity that aims to capture the country-level normativeTa
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context with respect to women’s employment, and test
its effects on aggregate country-level fertility trends in
developed countries.
By and large, the analyses support our hypotheses:
both the level of Gender Equity and the homogeneity of
its diffusion matters for fertility. We find evidence in
support of a U-shaped relationship between changes in
Gender Equity values and TFR: as countries start the
transition from a traditional to a more gender symmetric
partnership model, the diffusion of gender-equitable
attitudes has a negative impact on fertility until
these attitudes are sufficiently spread in the society.
Unsurprisingly, women everywhere pioneer the diffusion
of gender equity. In some countries men catch up quite
rapidly but in others they remain well behind. The
more women and men share equitable values, the more
‘dramatic’ is the transition in the sense that its effects
are more evident on fertility.
Our analytical framework builds on an assumed pro-
cess of attitudinal diffusion. This, of course, begs the
question of what drives such dynamics. What explains
why some societies embrace norms of gender equity
more rapidly and more homogenously than others?
Providing answers to these questions is clearly beyond
the scope of this article. And yet, it is possible to identify
some key drivers. One is undoubtedly related to the mat-
uration of the female role revolution. As long as wom-
en’s employment is strongly dominated by part-time
commitments, their role transformation will remain am-
bivalent. We should expect gender egalitarianism to ac-
celerate once it becomes normative for women to adopt
a full-timer-for-life identity. It is, secondly, at this point
that serious reconciliation policies, so much stressed
by McDonald (2006, 2013), are likely to emerge.
And thirdly, as emphasized by Esping-Andersen and
Billari (2012), the degree of social stratification in a
society is likely to influence the pace of diffusion.
Where there are no significant ethnic, racial, or religious
dividers, we should expect a more rapid (and universal)
diffusion.
We conducted several checks to test whether the em-
pirical findings are robust to an alternative operationali-
zation of the gender equity measure, fertility tempo
distortions, inclusion of additional independent vari-
ables, and outliers. Throughout, our key finding of a
parabolic relationship between the level of Gender
Equity and TFR is confirmed. The moderating effect of
the Gender Gap is consistent throughout the sensitivity
analyses but loses some statistical significance when the
sample size is reduced.
Our analyses have some limitations. The observation
window is limited to a couple of decades and so we
cannot observe the full transition from a traditional to a
gender egalitarian equilibrium for any given country.
Hence, we can only speculate about trends in gender
attitudes before the 1990s. Our analyses are based on
countries observed at different stages of the gender revo-
lution. To our knowledge, the World Values Survey
and European Values Study provide the oldest source of
data with a sample of countries large enough for cross-
national analysis. As an alternative, the International
Social Survey Program has a first rotating module in
1988 on gender, but very few countries were present
in its first wave.
Our empirical analysis is carried out at the macro
level to study the association between changes in gender
attitudes and fertility. When interpreting our findings,
it is important to bear in mind that they refer to the
country level and cannot be applied to individual behav-
iours. In other words, we cannot infer from our empir-
ical findings which micro mechanisms are producing
changes in aggregate fertility trends. Our decision to
focus on aggregate rather than individual-level behav-
iour is motivated by several considerations. First and
foremost, as highlighted by McDonald (2013), the
Gender Equity theory, which we largely build on, was
originally developed as a macro theory to explain fertil-
ity trends across different societal contexts. Therefore,
the argument we put forward stresses the importance
of the contextual level of gender equity and focuses on
aggregate explanations.
Secondly, conducting a micro-macro analysis
across several time periods and countries would pre-
sent itself with some practical issues. Each wave of
the WVS–EVS is a repeated cross-section with no
retrospective information on fertility. Therefore, when
using these data, it would not be possible to carry out
a longitudinal analysis matching individual fertility de-
cisions to contextual levels of gender equity. At the in-
dividual level, gender attitudes may influence fertility
decisions but the reverse is also possible. Furthermore,
gender attitudes are collected for the respondent but
not for his/her partner. Childbearing decisions are usu-
ally taken at the couple level. Thus, not having both
partners’ information restricts the analysis. While this
is beyond the scope of this article, a mismatch in gen-
der-equitable attitudes at the couple level may also
influence fertility decisions. To exemplify, Aassve et al.
(2014) show that couple-level inconsistencies in gender
ideology lower the risk of having a second child.
An interesting avenue for future research would be to
study how the normative context of gender equity
interacts with couples’ gender attitudes in influencing
fertility decisions.
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Notes
1 Due to data limitations, Myrskyla¨, Kohler and
Billari (2011) use the average GGG index between
the years 2006 and 2010.
2 Of course, at the extremes of the gender equity
distribution the gap between men and women is
necessarily 0, but during the transition different
configurations of the average level and gap between
men and women are possible.
3 We also attempted to construct a gender ideology
index using several items included in the data.
However, similar to Breen and Cooke (2005), we
did not find a clearly interpretable solution and we
preferred to use a single item that clearly represents
normative views concerning a gendered division of
labour. More details on alternative items included
in the WVS/EVS data and a discussion on the valid-
ity of our item is included in the Supplementary
material.
4 For simplicity, we refer to gender equity or gender-
equitable attitudes/respondents although we only
measure one dimension of gender role attitudes—
namely, attitudes towards women in the labour
market.
5 Controlling for age and education is important be-
cause both are strongly associated with gender-role
attitudes and fertility. Moreover, recent analyses by
Eeckhaut et al. (2013) suggest that specialization
models based on comparative advantages owing to
educational heterogamy (and subsequent potential
earnings disparities) in couples are more relevant in
male-breadwinner contexts than in more gender-
equal societies.
6 TFR data come from the World Bank Indicators
through the STATA module wbopendata (Azevedo,
2011).
7 To exemplify, in the first wave, Austria is surveyed
in 1990, so we use the average of the TFRs of year
1989, 1990, and 1991.
8 In the supplementary materials, we provide an add-
itional test for the effects of the Gender Gap by rep-
licating our analysis with a split sample before
and after phase B (the inflection point in Figure 4).
Our results are consistent with the full model speci-
fication but lose some statistical significance as the
sample size is reduced.
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